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ABSTRACT
The global constitution-the fundamental international norms and structures
that serve constitutional functions-should include mechanisms of democratic contes-
tation and accountability. This central claim of global constitutionalism faces three
objections extrapolatedfrom arguments made by Andrew Moravcsik and Giandomen-
ico Majone in debates about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU): the
global constitution only regulates issues of low salience for citizens; democratic control
is explicitly counter to the se/f-binding system that international regulations aim to
achieve; and the EU's track record suggests that democratic control at the international
level may be unnecessary to ensure congruence between voters' preferences and actual
regulations. These objections miss the profound impact of the global constitution and
the complexity of the "common goods" that multilevel regulations are meant to secure.
They also overlook some of the reasons to value democratic deliberation and contesta-
tion as mechanisms to enhance the trustworthiness of institutions and authorities.
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INTRODUCTION
Should core constitutional principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law be brought to bear on the international legal order? That is, can global con-
stitutionalism be defended?' This article defends one of global constitutionalism's
central claims: the global constitution-the fundamental international norms and
structures that serve constitutional functions-should include mechanisms of dem-
ocratic contestation and accountability. It is inconsistent to hold that domestic au-
thorities should be democratically accountable while the authorities who shape and
maintain the global constitution should not. This inconsistency is significant in that
the global constitution has a greater distributive impact, and those who shape it have
larger margins of discretion, than is sometimes claimed. Although the global consti-
tution's influence over individuals is often opaque and mediated by states and do-
mestic institutions, it raises fundamental issues of normative legitimacy. Subjects
have less of a moral obligation to comply with global rules and regulations when
they do not have a fair share of power over how to shape and change them.
Part I of this article presents some central challenges to calls for a more demo-
cratic global political order. The next parts lay out central discussions of the case
for democratizing the global constitution and responses to objections. Part II
summarizes the complex impact of global, multilevel regulations. Part III consid-
ers the various forms of common interests pursued by governments through such
regulations. The European Commission is also discussed to illustrate how the
concept of a global constitution has been blurred and how democratic measures
may help. Part IV sketches a general case for democratic contestation and ac-
countability. Finally, Part V draws on the material in the previous parts to rebut
the three arguments against a more democratic global constitution.
The pattern of rules and practices of domestic and international institutions
interact in profound ways that have pervasive effects on the distribution of benefits
and burdens within and across state borders. As a whole, this global basic structure
enables mutually beneficial cooperation ranging from material benefits of domestic
and international trade to rules of non-intervention and other principles of interna-
tional law. Notwithstanding these benefits, the present global basic structure also
contributes to injustices, including those wrought by unfair trade practices and un-
warranted international disregard for domestic human rights violations and oppres-
sive dictators. The domestic and international rules could avoid such disadvantages
1. Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 583 (2006).
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by yielding other distributions of benefits and burdens among individuals. Indeed,
other global basic structures might not even include sovereign states as we know
them, but rather cluster and bundle legal authority and immunity in different con-
figurations. For example, a world order akin to a global confederation as Immanuel
Kant urged,2 or one of insulated states as Jean-Jacques Rousseau favored.' A crucial
question then follows: what normative objectives and standards should regulate the
global basic structure as a whole? This issue can be further refined. Given that we
live in a system of states, should the international rules and institutions that regulate
their interaction be subject to democratic control by individuals, or does it suffice
that democratic states have granted their consent? Some further comments about
the role of states in the present global basic structure are appropriate at this point.
We now live in a system of states where state governments and state borders
are central forces that shape and constrain the rules and actors of political, social,
and economic interaction. But state borders do not completely contain these rules,
and actors other than individual states affect them. An obvious and extreme case
can be found in how the rules of the EU regulate its citizens and member states.
This international order is aptly described by David Held:
[A]n international order involving the conjuncture of: dense net-
works of regional and global economic relations which stretch be-
yond the control of any single state (even of dominant states);
extensive webs of transnational relations and instantaneous elec-
tronic communications over which particular states have limited
influence; a vast array of international regimes and organizations
which can limit the scope for action of the most powerful states;
and the development of a global military order, and the build-up of
the means of "total" warfare as an enduring feature of the contem-
porary world, which can reduce the range of policies available to
governments and their citizens.'
Many of the significant rules of the international order are part of what Anne
Peters calls "global (or international) constitutional law." She describes global consti-
2. IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT'S Po-
LITICAL WRITINGS 41, 41-53 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1st ed. 1970).
3. See STANLEY HOFFMANN, Rousseau on War and Peace, in THE STATE OF WAR 54, 62 (1965).
4. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMO-
POLITAN GOVERNANCE 20 (1995).
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tutional law as "the most important norms which regulate political activity and rela-
tionships in the global polity (consisting of states and other subjects of international
law)."' Its rules and practices include, inter alia, the treaties and practices that define
sovereignty, the rules of the World Trade Organization, and erga omnes obligations.
The present global basic structure is thus not a set of sovereign states. Rather,
it is a system of "multilevel governance" where states and other actors enjoy sev-
eral forms of decision-making. "Multilevel" has many different meanings;6 here it
refers to the vertical dispersal of political authority from the state upward to the
supranational level and downward to subnational levels with complex forms of
interplay. Multilevel also refers to the horizontal dispersal of authority whereby
non-state actors participate in rule formulation and implementation.
The term governance likewise has multiple uses.7 Government occurs when
organizations, typically states, govern or regulate issue areas mainly through hier-
archical control in the shadow of coercion. In contrast, organizations exercise gov-
ernance when they come together to regulate without formal hierarchy or
coercion. In such instances, governments consent to a vast collection of rules rang-
ing from treaties to nonbinding resolutions that form the global constitution.
These mechanisms of consensus or consent "may or may not derive from legal
and formally prescribed responsibilities and ... do not necessarily rely on police
powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance."'
Unlike government, governance is not held to democratic standards. Yet many
regard governance and the present global constitution as normatively legitimate.
One reason may be that the procedures and rules of governance are based on and
respect state sovereignty and autonomy without operative threats of coercive force.
That is, the global constitution is based on mutual consent among states, many of
which are democratic. This raises an important question: is democratic accountabil-
ity therefore an inappropriate standard for global constitutional law?
The answer to this question can be formed in response to three objections,
extrapolated from debates about the democratic deficit of the European Union
5. Peters, supra note 1, at 582.
6. See Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 233, 233-34 (2003).
7. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD 2-5 (1995);
Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001)
428 final (July 25, 2001).
8. James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITH-
OUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 4 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto
Czempiel eds., 1992).
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(EU). These objections do not consider the profound impact of the global consti-
tution and the complexity of the common goods that multilevel regulations are
meant to secure. They also overlook some of the reasons to value democratic de-
liberation and contestation as mechanisms that enhance the trustworthiness of
institutions and authorities.
I. THE CASE AGAINST DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Domestically, democratic accountability is often regarded as a sine qua non for
legitimate rule that imposes undesirable or inescapable effects on some citizens for
the benefit of others. Many extrapolate this democratic intuition to global constitu-
tional law, for instance, in the form expressed by global constitutionalism. One rea-
son may be that we find it conceptually difficult to disentangle legitimacy and
democracy. That is, we believe that legitimate modes of governance must be demo-
cratically accountable. This entanglement has been described as follows: "In our
Western view, only democratic systems, advocating the values of liberty, equality
and community, deserve the loyalty of the citizens. Hence, the notions legitimacy
and democratic legitimacy must be considered as interchangeable.... ."
This conflation of legitimacy and democracy, and the presumption in favor of
democracy merit, challenge and scrutiny. Must multilevel regulation of the kind
expressed in present global constitutional law be subject to more direct demo-
cratic control? If so, why, if international regulations are the result of treaties
freely agreed upon by sovereign parties with whatever domestic normative legiti-
macy they might have? What is the value added by citizens' consent through
democratic contestation for regional or international authorities?
These questions raise fundamental issues about standards of legitimacy ap-
propriate for the global order and for multilevel political orders in general. What
normative standards should be brought to bear on institutions beyond the state
individually or for the global constitution as a whole? And how might democratic
rule, in particular, contribute to make such multilevel governance more norma-
tively legitimate? The debate about the alleged democratic deficit of the EU may
serve as a heuristic device to formulate answers to the aforementioned questions.
This does not suggest that the debate can be simply transposed or generalized
wholesale, as the EU has unique competences and its member states exercise
prominent, complex control. Yet the strongest arguments against a more demo-
9. Koen Lenaerts & Marlies Desomer, New Models of Constitution-Making in Europe: The Quest
for Legitimacy, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1217, 1220 n.15 (2002).
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cratic EU could also be applied against a more democratic global constitution.
And arguments in support of the EU being governed more democratically may
support the case for global constitutionalism.
As previously mentioned, many have claimed that the EU suffers from a
democratic deficit. ° However, reasoned objections dismiss this diagnosis. Andrew
Moravcsik asserts that international organizations generally, and the EU in par-
ticular, do not require much in the way of direct democratic legitimacy." Giando-
menico Majone has further argued that increased democratic accountability
would be detrimental to the objectives of the EU. These arguments have stimu-
lated wide-ranging debates, 2 and at least three objections to a more democratic
global constitutionalism can be extrapolated from them.
A. The Low Impact of Global Constitution Within the State
One objection is that the global constitution's impact within the state is low.
This objection arises from the claim that international organizations, including
the EU, only address issue areas that are of low or no salience to voters, such as the
removal of non-tariff barriers. 3 In contrast, the issues that voters are concerned
with-fiscal policies, social welfare, education, and culture-remain the domain
of domestic, democratic authorities. Thus, to subject the policies of international
organizations to political contestation will neither get voters' attention nor affect
any policy changes of concern to them.
B. The Objectives of Multilevel Regulation Prohibit Democratic Accountability
The second objection is based on the assertion that a central objective of in-
ternational organizations in general, and the EU in particular, is actually to insu-
late certain decisions from democratic contestation. Majone argues that the EU is
best regarded as a "regulatory state" whose objective is Pareto efficient outcomes,
10. See generally Andreas Follesdal, Survey Article: The Legitimacy Deficits of the European
Union, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 441 (2006).
11. See Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a "Democratic Deficit" in World Politics? A Framework for
Analysis, 39 Gov'T & OPPOSITION 336,347 (2004).
12. Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to
Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533, 534-37 (2006).
13. Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 360.
GLOBAL BASIC STRUCTURE
rather than redistributive solutions or outcomes that create losers.14 International
agencies help resolve collective action problems when each party is tempted to free
ride. And governments can use international obligations to bind their own hands,
so that their voters will not sacrifice important longer-term objectives for the sake
of myopic short-term goals.
C. Multilevel Democracy is Unnecessary for Preference-Policy Congruence
The final objection can be found in Moravcsik's argument that the track record
of the EU shows that its policies are in fact close to the preferences of the median
voter and, as a result, complaints about unelected, undemocratic bureaucrats and
executives being nonresponsive are at best overblown. Thus, the constitution-like
checks and balances and the democratic control exercised within member states
serve to bring EU policies in line with the preferences of the average voter.
To present the case for democratic global constitutionalism and to respond to
these objections, the following parts address three central topics: the impact of the
current global constitution and its various forms of multilevel regulation, the
common interests that multilevel organizations promote, and the reasons for valu-
ing democratic deliberation and contestation as mechanisms to enhance the trust-
worthiness of institutions and authorities.
II. THE DISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The global constitution has a massive impact on individuals, particularly on
their life plans and opportunities. The impact is often indirect and surreptitious.
Brief discussion of the reasons for such an impact and its implications follow.
First, recall that sovereign states are "socially constructed" by norms of the
global constitution. This particular configuration of legal powers and immunities
has allowed inhabitants to pursue their interests with fewer fears of intervention
and domination by external actors, except when there are intergovernmental
agreements that provide for such intervention. On the other hand, "tall" state bor-
ders have also served to reduce inhabitants' chances of obtaining foreign assistance
when opposing abusive leaders.
Within the international arena, treaties bind states in several ways. Binding
14. Giandomenico Majone, A European Regulatory State?, in EUROPEAN UNION: POWER AND
POLICY-MAKING 263-77 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1st ed. 1996); Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of
the Regulatory State in Europe, W. EUR. POL., July 1994, at 77.
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U.N. Security Council Chapter VII resolutions commit all domestic and EU legal
systems. Some international authorities have the power to make decisions with di-
rect and sometimes obvious effects on individuals. 5 For example, decisions of the
World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body have global ramifications for
business operators and citizens. Likewise, the U.N. Security Council's "smart sanc-
tions" are directed at specific individuals, businesses, or groups of persons. 6
International regulations also have profound, but less visible, impacts when they
affect the opportunity space of national authorities, often by placing it beyond par-
liamentary control. Consider the complex areas in which WTO regulations and
non-state financial trade association regulations are heavily involved: 7 immigration
rules, regulation of the banking sector,8 and foreign investments or Internet. 19 The
benefits of larger markets and reduced transaction costs should not be ignored. Still,
many affected consumers and other concerned citizens are often effectively excluded
from participation and insight, even though the opportunities and benefits will
favor only some of them. Others may suffer a loss of relative bargaining power due
to the regulatory details or from open borders or global markets. For instance, less
economically developed states face new risks of a "race to the bottom" when their
strongest comparative advantages in the competition for multinational corporations
are lax human rights protections for workers and communities.
The impact on states' maneuvering room can hardly be overestimated. The
increased interdependence and trade among states have curtailed and even re-
moved many of the economic and political instruments that governments could
previously use to protect citizens from external shocks. Other states and non-state
actors can now impact citizens of other states in ways that their own government
no longer can.2" Thus, the extensive, complex interdependence among states re-
15. Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters, The Phenomenon of Multilevel Regulation: Interactions Be-
tween Global, EU, and National Regulatory Spheres, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU 9,
14-15 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2008).
16. See Lain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 72 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 159, 159-60 (2003).
17. See generally Caroline Bradley, Financial Trade Associations and Multilevel Regulation, in
MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU,supra note 15, at 73.
18. See generally Bart De Meester, Multilevel Banking Regulation, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION
AND THE EU,supra note 15, at 101.
19. See generally Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, Multilevel Internet Governance Involving the Eu-
ropean Union, Nation States and NGOs, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU, supra note 15, at
145.
20. See John G. Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in TAM-
ING GLOBALIZATION 93, 93-94 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
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duces the value of sovereignty in the sense of legal immunity from foreign influ-
ence. Indeed, as states increasingly engage in vertical multilevel governance,
sovereignty changes from being a constitutive feature of states to a set of bargain-
ing chips by which states pool decision-making authority in various sectors.2' The
result is a drastic reduction in the worth of domestic, democratic mechanisms.
The value of domestic democratic arrangements is further attenuated by hor-
izontal multilevel governance in which the role of the state changes from having a
quasi-monopoly on political authority to being in charge of integrating partly pri-
vatized, partly internationalized authorities. The state must initiate, coordinate,
and synthesize the conduct of many different international and private actors.2
Often the national domestic authorities are left with little or no influence. Con-
sider the international regulation of technical requirements for the registration of
pharmaceuticals.23 The laudable aim is to speed up development and registration
of new medicines to benefit patients and companies. However, only the latter take
part in the processes that lead to regulations. Unelected industry experts with
technical expertise, but no democratic authority, exercise great influence on regu-
latory decisions.24 There is little transparency or democratic oversight by patients,
public payers, or other actors. As a result, these regulations become de facto inter-
national standards and are incorporated into national law without much scrutiny,
even though they override competing national regulations.
Oftentimes the multilevel system skews power toward the executive and away
from the legislative branch. For example, the decision rules of the EU typically
reduce the ability of national parliaments to exercise their legislative authority and
oversight over the executive branch.25 This situation is aided by various permuta-
tions of two-level diplomacy. These brief discussions show that international insti-
tutions, organizations, and regimes affect the allocation of benefits and burdens
among individuals. The upshot is that the present global constitution creates a
21. Robert O. Keohane, Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty
in International Society, in WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE
COLD WAR 165, 177 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sorensen eds., 1995).
22. Philipp Genschel & Bernhard Zangl, Transformations of the State-From Monopolist to Man-
ager of Political Authority 1-2 (Transformations of the State, Working Paper No. 076, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.sfb597.unibremen.de/pages/download.php?ID=90&SPRACHE=en&TABL
E=AP&TYPE=PDF.
23. See generally Barbel R. Dorbeck-Jung, Challenges to the Legitimacy of International Regula-
tion: The Case of Pharmaceuticals Standardisation, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU, supra
note 15, at 51.
24. Id. at 65.
25. See Follesdal & Hix, supra note 12, at 535.
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system of states, albeit one that is strongly modified by several forms of multilevel
governance. Actors and rules beyond a state's political authorities may enhance
justice and well-being for the state's citizens; however, these same actors and rules
may also prevent, bolster, skew, or otherwise hamper elected, accountable authori-
ties. Thus, the global constitution raises important questions concerning norma-
tive legitimacy and the right of authorities to expect compliance. Domestically,
the distributive impact of laws and policies gives rise to claims that they should be
subject to popular scrutiny and control in the form of human rights protections
and mechanisms of democratic accountability. The impact of the global constitu-
tion, both on individuals and on their state governments, should yield the same
conclusion at the global level. Global constitutional law should include mecha-
nisms of democratic accountability. Some have responded that, at least in the case
of the EU, such accountability would be unnecessary at best and severely hinder
the common interests it was created to secure. Do these arguments against de-
mocracy in the EU and global constitutional law hold up against scrutiny? This
question requires us to initially consider why democratic accountability may be
contrary to individuals' common interests.
III. THE CONFUSING INTERPRETATIONS OF "COMMON INTERESTS,"
ILLUSTRATED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
It is close to a truism that agreements among informed, free parties will be in
their common interest. That is, parties will not enter into a binding agreement
unless each stands to benefit from it. To secure such benefits, it may be defensible
at times for a democracy to bind its own hands in ways that a later majority can-
not easily unbind. In the case of the EU, two distinct cases can be discerned. After
briefly outlining them, I will address the broad range of other decisions that are
arguably best made by international bodies. However, these other decisions may
well be subject to democratic contestation without great loss.
Some citizen interests clearly support the supremacy of common decisions at
the EU level. A central authority beyond the control of any individual or state
government can help resolve two kinds of collective action problems. First, one
disadvantage of democratically accountable authorities is that the competition for
votes tempts politicians to pursue policies that are in citizens' short-term interest
but detrimental in the long run. Such concerns support "nondemocratic" agencies
such as an independent central bank. Second, a central authority may be neces-
sary to secure general compliance with policies that reap benefits only when all
GLOBAL BASIC STRUCTURE
comply. Thus, governments have delegated authority over certain regulatory poli-
cies to the EU, such as a single market, product standards, and health and safety
rules. Governments in each country would otherwise be tempted to default in
order to win domestic votes. The common interest in resolving such collective ac-
tion and free-rider problems should trump the "egoistic" member state prefer-
ences on these topics, even when the electorates have similar preferences.
Majone argues that the need for such common interest decisions precludes a
more democratic EU, noting that one of the justifications for the creation of the
EU was the avoidance of the collective action problems that democracy cannot
resolve.26 In response, I agree that there may be good reasons to keep certain pol-
icy decisions away from the ordinary election cycle, and, instead to give them to
bodies like independent banks, courts, and agencies that ensure fair competition.
But the number of policy decisions to which this would apply may be fewer than
one may think. Moreover, I assert that there are many other common interests
that the EU and other international organizations can and do promote and which
democratic contestation does not threaten. To the contrary, identifying these com-
mon interests and ensuring their promotion requires something similar to demo-
cratic deliberation and accountability. And these regulations in pursuit of common
interests should not always override domestic, democratic preferences.
It is an open question whether those interests that citizens have in common
are best served by common policies at the EU or at some other level. Consider that
we all have similar interests in goods for sustenance, security, and welfare. Some
of these may be best provided by the individual, others by a family, and still others
by one's state, or, arguably, by organizations above the state. As a result, a determi-
nation must be made as to which level of political organization should be author-
ized to secure these various interests. A decision about which of these regulations
should have priority in cases of conflict is also required; it would be slipshod to
hold that policies that aspire to regulate a larger area should always take prece-
dence, regardless of the nature of the interests they secure. In the case of the EU,
some regulations create benefits of scale, resolve coordination problems, and even
create new goods that might be of value, such as a unified voice as a world actor.
Yet some of these gains may be less important to individuals or their states than
the losses that a particular regulation may inflict.
To make some headway on how to think about these issues and Majone's ar-
guments, we must first take a closer look at how Pareto improvements impact in-
26. See Giandomenico Majone, Europe's "Democratic Deficit": The Question of Standards, 4 EUR.
L.J. 5, 16-18 (1998).
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dividuals. This is necessary because regulations that improve the situation of some
without leaving anyone worse off may raise issues of distributive justice and fair
decision-making. There are at least four reasons for such issues.
Often there are different ways to improve the situation relative to the status
quo. One distributive issue addresses which of the improvements to implement,
since any choice will benefit some more than others. This holds true for a wide
variety of regulations that are allegedly in the interest of every signatory. Consider
the conflicts concerning details of the World Trade Organization and the regula-
tion of pharmaceuticals, the accounting standards of the Basel Committee versus
those of the International Accounting Standards Board,27 or the conflicting defi-
nitions of terrorism by the United Nations and regional bodies.28
Second, due to the complex interdependence of states,29 many Pareto-improv-
ing regulatory and policy decisions may affect other policy areas. Multilevel regu-
lation is typically issue specific, and initially, the various authorities are not
harmonized with regard to competence or authority. The spillover effects may be
drastic. Consider the alleged impact of free market policies in the EU on member
states' abilities to maintain social welfare arrangements. These spillover effects
raise challenging concerns about effective and legitimate coordination." Solutions
typically include limiting the number of actors while making them multipurpose
or reducing the interaction between them. The latter is difficult when states
jointly seek to regulate a wide range of issue areas, while the former increases the
need for normatively justifiable mechanisms of conflict resolution. We may be
witnessing the latter in the increased concerns about a legitimacy crisis of the EU.
Its objectives have increased, ranging from securing peace, which is close to a
public good in the economists' sense, to the long list enumerated in the Lisbon
Treaty,"i which includes the well-being of its peoples, freedom, security, a single
market, sustainable development, and a social market economy aimed at full em-
ployment.32 The objectives and policies may be laudable and appropriate for the
27. See generally De Meester, supra note 18.
28. Erling Johannes Husabo, The Interaction between Global, Regional and National Regulation
in the Definition of Terrorism, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU,supra note 15, at 169.
29. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 20-32 (3d
ed., Longman 2001) (1977).
30. Hooghe & Marks, supra note 6, at 239.
31. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 2, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon
Treaty].
32. Lisbon Treaty art. 2.
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EU, but they are unordered, vague, and create dilemmas. Their all-important
details, relative weights, and limits remain obscure and contested. Indeed, they
are the stuff of political contestation among parties and ideologies within mem-
ber states. The EU must address such conflicts about interdependent regulations
in a sufficiently responsive and transparent way. We witness similar tensions with
respect to the global constitution. The coordination problem among regulatory
regimes is addressed below as the "fragmentation of international law."33
Third, the multilevel regulations may well be Pareto improvements in the sense
that they can benefit every signatory state, but still not benefit each individual. Even
though each state gains, some individuals and segments may lose. The increased
international interdependence outlined in Part I renders more governments unable
or unwilling to compensate their losers. Thus the new regulation has an obvious
distributive impact that merits normative concern for the domestic government and
other authorities that create and maintain the global constitution.
Fourth, note that many EU regulations are not Pareto improvements. Con-
sider interest rate policies, market "de"regulations detrimental to some producers
for domestic markets, and EU expenditure policies that only benefit certain de-
pressed regions or targeted groups while imposing burdens on others.3 4 Presum-
ably, the best defense of such regulations is that the unit of assessment should not
be a single policy, but rather the set of regulations as a whole. It is this package
that is a Pareto improvement, compared to the lack of common regulation. This
response underscores the distributive impact even of Pareto improvements and
the need for decision-making procedures to ensure that complex package deals
and short-term sacrifices by some member states and citizens do, in fact, even out
over time. Thus, the common interest in a regional or global authority does not
remove distributive concerns, but rather highlights the need for acceptable deci-
sion-making procedures for selecting policies and combinations thereof.
The upshot of these comments is that the notion of common interests should
not lead us to dismiss the need for democratic accountability and control over
those bodies that are authorized to make laws and regulations. Even in the ab-
33. See generally International Law Commission, Study Group of the International Law Com-
mission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expan-
sion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Addendum,
Appendix, Draft Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Add (May
2,2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
34. Follesdal & Hix, supra note 12, at 543; see generally Christian Joerges, Der Philosoph Als
Wahrer Rechtslehrer, 5 EUR. L.J. 147 (1999) (reviewing GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING Eu-
ROPE (1996).
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sence of redistributive arrangements, a wide range of regulations have significant
impact on the lives and opportunities of individuals. The changing role of the
European Commission can be used to illustrate some of the challenges and pos-
sible strategies to alleviate them, including increased democratic accountability.
A. The Case of the European Commission
The European Commission has had a legal monopoly on legislative proposals in
the EU. This is presumably due to its mandate to "promote the general interest of the
Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end."3 Those who prize a politically
independent and depoliticized EU may worry that recent reductions in European
Commission independence will politicize it at the cost of its credibility. According to
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament will be charged with electing the Com-
mission President.3" What are we to make of these risks of politicization?37
The Lisbon Treaty, as those before it, skirts crucial issues about the nature of
the interests the EU is to pursue. "The Union shall have an institutional frame-
work which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its inter-
ests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States." 8 However, the interests
of EU citizens are not automatically best served by granting legal supremacy to all
EU-level regulations aimed to secure "the European interest."
Given the European Commission's institutional mandate, there is a very real
risk that the Commission may misinterpret all objections by member states as
expressions of inappropriate concern for national interests. Such a bias is clear in
the 2001 White Paper on Governance issued by the European Commission. 9 In
the document, the Commission offers only one diagnosis of existing disagree-
ments: that the intergovernmental Council of Ministers inappropriately pursues
sectoral, national interests.4 ° The White Paper ignores other, more legitimate rea-
sons for deadlock. One reason might be that governments foresee citizens of one
35. Lisbon Treaty art. 9D.1.
36. Lisbon Treaty art. 9A.1.
37. See Giandomenico Majone, State, Market and Regulatory Competition in the European Econ-
omy, in CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION? EUROPE FACING THE CHALLENGES OF DEEPENING,
DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 94, 121 (Andrew Moravcsik ed., 1998).
38. Lisbon Treaty art 9.1.
39. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7, at 29; see Andreas Follesdal, The
Political Theory of the White Paper on Governance: Hidden and Fascinating, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 73, 79-81
(2003).
40. See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 7, at 29-30.
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or more member states suffering unacceptably large losses as the result of a pro-
posed measure. It is therefore implausible to assume that the Commission is best
suited to make legislative proposals on the basis of its judgment about the general
interests of the EU. National protests and appeals to national interest should not
always be dismissed as illegitimate. To the contrary, the Commission's contested
conception of the interests of the EU, its member states, and citizens should not
always overrule protests.
At least three strategies to reduce the risk of bias in EU regulations are worth
mentioning. One strategy is to remove the monopoly on regulatory decision-mak-
ing, so that other EU bodies can also propose regulations. A second strategy is to
implement a new procedure, first introduced in the draft constitutional treaty and
kept in later modifications.41 Under the procedure, the parliaments of member
states can gain access to legislative proposals and appeal them if the parliaments
suspect that the proposals violate the principle of subsidiarity. This principle holds
that "the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed ac-
tion cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level."' 2 This mechanism may facili-
tate important public discussion and deliberation about the objectives and alterna-
tive means available to member states and the European Union. Such discussions
may also be crucial to citizens' long-term support for the political order, and thus
to the authorities' ability to govern.
The third strategy is to politicize the Commission through "parliamenta-
rism," whereby the European Parliament elects the Commission President. This
may secure more transparent and representative Commission decisions on such
contested issues. Will this politicization threaten the credibility of the Commis-
sion as Majone fears? There is indeed a risk that some of the member states will
refuse to collectively bind themselves and that, as a result, some decisions will be
overturned prematurely. On the other hand, democratic contestation and delib-
eration does promise to make some of the distributive issues and actual choices
more transparent, and this may be important to assure citizens and member states
that the Commission does indeed promote their general interests, and does so in a
defensible and responsive way.
Consider, for instance, the European Parliament's rejection of European
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso's first slate of commissioners in 2004.
41. Lisbon Treaty art. 3B.
42. Lisbon Treaty art. 3B.3.
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European Parliament members objected to proposed Commissioner of Justice
and Home Affairs Rocco Buttiglione for his alleged views concerning homosexu-
als and women. This protest assured the European public that its votes for Mem-
bers of European Parliament could affect the composition and policies of the
Commission, and that the rules provide a certain degree of responsiveness of
elected representatives to the interest of citizens. Such responsiveness and assur-
ance are crucial contributions of democratic procedures.
In order to address the objections to democratizing global constitution law,
we must finally consider several reasons to value democratic contestation, delib-
eration, and accountability, reasons that are often overlooked.
IV. FRAGMENTS OF A THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
Leaving details aside for our purposes, let us here regard democracy as a set of
institutionally established procedures that regulate43 competition for control over
political authority on the basis of deliberation, where all or almost all adult citizens
may participate in an electoral mechanism, and whereby their expressed preferences
over alternative candidates determine the outcome in such ways that the govern-
ment is accountable to, and thereby responsive to, all or as many as possible.
The best argument for democratic decision-making is that democratic rule is,
over time, more reliably responsive to the best interests of the members of the po-
litical order." These interests include basic needs and a fair share of additional
goods and burdens. These goods should include a share of political influence over
the institutions that in turn shape individuals' opportunities and choices.
Democracy is arguably the institutional arrangement that most reliably pre-
vents risks to individuals' vital needs and secures a just distribution of other goods.
Amartya Sen has argued that freedom of the press and democratic competition
among political parties protect against famines.45 Further, compared to the alter-
natives, democratic arrangements have better mechanisms for ensuring that au-
thorities reliably, fairly, and effectively govern, and provide public assurance that
such is the case.
Democratic contestation for legislative and executive power is a central mech-
43. Follesdal & Hix, supra note 12, at 547-49. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY
(1998).
44. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY 113 (1989); cf. Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in
TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 77, 94-96 (Margaret Levi & Valerie Braithwaite eds., 1998).
45. E.g., Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 3, 7-8.
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anism in this regard.4" Such contestation creates incentives that align the interests
of the subjects to those of their rulers so as to ensure that the rulers are and remain
responsive. Real political party contestation and critical media are crucial before,
during, and after contestation. When parties form their policy platforms they
help socialize citizens toward various conceptions of fair policy platforms. Politi-
cal parties thus contribute to citizens' informed preference about feasible public
policies and promote concern for others. In multilevel political orders this is par-
ticularly important and difficult, and careful regulation of multilevel party for-
mation may help develop the requisite concern for citizens in other subunits.
Contestation and scrutiny are also crucial when citizens and parties seek to
assess the record of the government in power and the plausible alternatives. Public
scrutiny by the media and the opposition also helps ensure that power is not
abused. Ultimately, contestation and scrutiny help render the institutions and au-
thorities trustworthy. These contributions of democratic deliberation and contes-
tation are important reasons to value democracy.
V. RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS TO DEMOCRATIZING
THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTION
The present reflections have so far laid out some reasons why the global constitu-
tion should be democratic. I now turn to reconsider some of the central arguments
against such democratization, which were drawn from the ongoing debate about the
need for a more democratic EU. The discussions about the direct and indirect impact
of the global constitution, the multifarious forms of common interests institutions
may secure, and the reasons for valuing democracy help to address the application of
similar objections against a more democratic global constitutionalism.
A. The Low Impact of the Global Constitution Beyond the State
Against this objection I submit two points about the global constitution's de-
gree of impact and its perceived salience for voters. First, global constitutional law
has both indirect and direct impact on individuals, and currently diminishes
many states' ability to protect and promote their citizens' interests. This impact
supports the claim that individuals should influence these rules. Second, this
claim cannot be rebutted by observations that voters in fact currently show little
46. See V. 0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 459 (1961); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 282-85 (Harper Collins 2008) (1941).
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interest in these issues. Of course, anti-globalization protests would make such
objections immediately dubious. But I also submit that what we as citizens per-
ceive as important is largely determined by the institutions that surround and
shape us. The salience of a policy issue is thus partly endogenous to the political
process-whether political parties and media choose to "mobilize bias."'47 With
more political contestation at the international level, we can expect more attention
to the direct and indirect effects of the global constitution as a whole, and of par-
ticular international organizations and regimes. Currently, contested issues in-
clude the complex impact of global economic liberalization. Thus, democratic
contestation at the international level may shed light on the effects of complex in-
terdependence and help determine what, if anything, might and should be done.
B. The Objectives of Multilevel Regulation Prohibit Democratic Accountability
There may be good reasons to keep some international agencies outside direct
democratic control. Similar to some domestic agencies, this would combat coordi-
nation and commitment problems, or protect minorities against mistaken majori-
tarian decisions. Thus, unaccountable courts and agencies may be normatively
legitimate even though they are not held directly or indirectly accountable to a
democratically elected legislature.48 But these concessions do not counsel the
wholesale rejection of democratic control over the global constitution.
First, Part III argued that other regulations in pursuit of other common in-
terests still raise important distributive questions, even when they singly or jointly
are Pareto improvements. Second, the global constitution must address the issue
of trustworthiness. It does not suffice to show that particular independent bodies
now pursue Pareto improvements. There must also be mechanisms in place to
ensure citizens that these independent authorities can be trusted over time. In the
domestic cases of independent agencies, central banks and courts are embedded
so that they still largely operate in the shadow of democratic scrutiny and ac-
countability.49 This objection to democratic accountability should thus instead
lead us to look for ways that the global constitution as a whole can be subject to
47. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 30 (1960).
48. See generally Andreas Follesdal, Why International Human Rights Judicial Review Might be
Democratically Legitimate, 52 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 103 (2007).
49. Marlene Wind, Associate Professor, Centre for European Politics, Univ. of Copenhagen,
The Nordics, the EU, and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review, Presented at
the Conference on Global Constitutionalism: Processes and Substance (Jan. 18, 2008).
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democratic scrutiny, deliberation, contestation, and accountability while allowing
some select agencies or organizations within it to operate independently, while
maintaining the public trust that they pursue the common interest.
C. Multilevel Democracy is Unnecessary for Preference Policy Congruence
Finally, with regard to the objection that democracy is not needed to ensure the
requisite congruence between citizens' preferences and particular policies, I submit
three comments. First, we must insist that the empirical question is not only about
the particular track record of one policy, but also the choice of decision-making ar-
rangements. We wish to determine the reliability of alternative mechanisms-
whether citizens can be given reasons to believe that these arrangements will reliably
maintain acceptable regulations and policies is important. For democratic arrange-
ments, this might be expected because party contestation for votes helps to hold the
executive and legislative bodies sufficiently responsive to the best interests of voters.
It remains to be seen what other, nondemocratic, institutionalized mechanisms
might be put in place to render authorities trustworthy in their future policies.
Second, congruence between preferences and policies is not enough. Citizens'
preferences are not determined in a manner completely exogenous to the political
process, but are partly shaped by the opportunities, alternatives, and constraints that
the authorities present, whether they are nondemocratic or democratic regimes.
That citizens are satisfied in nondemocratic, or even dictatorial political orders, is of
little normative significance if their preferences are not formed on the basis of in-
formed deliberation about the range of possible policies and their likely effects.
Third, this objection underplays the other reasons to value democracy be-
yond its role in aggregating the input of preferences. Even if there are alternative
decision mechanisms that reliably make authorities responsive to citizens' prefer-
ences, an important further concern is that citizens should be assured that this is
in fact the case. Such assurance is often important to secure general compliance. 0
Democratic procedures, especially opposition parties and media scrutiny, play im-
portant roles in this regard. Alternative competitors for political office with com-
peting policy agendas help citizens determine whether their present leaders could
have done better and identify who is responsible for specific policies. This in turn
provides assurance to citizens that their leaders are sufficiently responsive. And
public knowledge thereof enhances politicians' incentives to remain so.
In conclusion, present reflections have bolstered the case for why the global con-
50. See Follesdal, supra note 10, at 454-59.
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stitution should include mechanisms that would make it more democratically ac-
countable toward citizens. I identified some of the central arguments for and against
such democratization, drawing largely on the ongoing debate about the alleged
need for a more democratic EU.
I have also outlined some reasons why decisions at the international level both
about the design and authority of international organization and regimes and
their own decision-making processes-have important consequences. In domes-
tic settings, such distributive conflicts give rise to challenges of normative legiti-
macy, to which democratic arrangements are often regarded as one acceptable
response. I have considered and rejected some prominent objections to the need
for democratic accountability of this global constitution. I believe that the argu-
ments drawn from the debate about the EU do not stand up to scrutiny when
applied to global constitutionalism. The normative claim of global constitutional-
ism holds up: If the international legal order is to be justifiable to us, its subjects,
core constitutional principles of democracy should be brought to bear.
